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Introduction
The Solomon Islands, neighbouring eastern Papua New Guinea and 
northern Vanuatu, are directly across the Coral Sea from Australia. They 
consist of a double chain of islands, which include several large high 
tropical islands with mountainous jungle-clad spines. The islands stretch 
across 1,500 kilometres of deep ocean, from five to twelve degrees south 
of the equator. The modern nation ends in the north at the Shortland 
Islands, within sight of Bougainville, which with Buka Island is part of 
the same chain but incorporated into German New Guinea in the 1880s 
and now part of Papua New Guinea. Its southern extreme is the Santa Cruz 
Group and three Polynesian outliers, separated from the Torres Group in 
northern Vanuatu by only 160 kilometres. The land area is around 28,000 
square kilometres, spread over six large and a multitude of small islands 
and atolls. Heavily forested, many of the islands descend precipitously 
to the coasts often with rainforest environments right down to the 
beaches, mangroves and lagoons. A British Protectorate was established 
in 1893, with the capital at Tulagi in the Nggela Group. After the Second 
World War, the British moved the capital from Tulagi to Honiara on 
Guadalcanal’s north-east coast, utilizing infrastructure left behind by the 
Japanese and Americans.
*This article is peer reviewed 
† Dr Clive Moore is an Associate Professor in the School of History, Philosophy, Religion 
and Classics at The University of Queensland.
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Independence came in 1978 and the nation progressed reasonably 
well for a decade, but poor government practices, unbalanced use of 
natural resources, an unbalanced development policy, and an increasingly 
corrupt political elite dragged the nation down. Discontent simmered on 
Guadalcanal, which along with the capital city, attracted agricultural and 
mining developments and concomitant internal migrations that increasingly 
alienated the Guale from their island. After ten years of protest, in 1998 they 
began the Isatubu Freedom Movement, a militia begun with the intention 
of driving the predominantly Malaitan migrants off their island. This was 
countered by the formation of the Malaitan Eagle Force, a rival militia 
established to protect Malaitan settlers on Guadalcanal, which eventually 
staged a coup to overthrow the government of Bartholomew Ulufa’alu in 
June 2000. Guadalcanal became a war zone, particularly around Honiara. 
The national economy disintegrated, and the Solomon Islands government 
pleaded for outside intervention to restore law and order.
The Solomon Islands was the Pacific’s worst ‘failing’ nation, its economy 
in tatters, services were no longer delivered. Total disaster was averted by 
the nation’s subsistence core at village level, which continued to operate. 
An Australian-led intervention occurred in July 2003, which has restored 
law and order but has a long task ahead to resuscitate the nation. This 
paper is about the motivations and timing behind the Australian decision to 
support the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).
Australian-led Intervention
In the 1980s the major aid donors to Solomon Islands were Australia, the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and USA, and in the 1990s Japan, ROC 
(Taiwan), the EU, Australia, and New Zealand. Taiwan had promised to 
lend the Solomon Islands government US$25 million, of which US$20 
million had been advanced by August 2002. Cumulatively, Australia has 
given most and had the most effect on the islands since independence. 
Thirty years ago, except in Papua New Guinea, Australian aid to Pacific 
nations was focused on regional organisations and ways to preserve 
culture. In the early 1970s, Great Britain was the only substantial aid 
donor in Solomon Islands. In the lead up to self-government (1971-76) 
Australia provided A$1.35 million in bilateral aid for projects, technical 
assistance, food aid and education, and another A$6.932 million up until 
1979.1
An Australian diplomatic mission was established in 1978, and Australia’s 
policy largely followed a centralized ‘modernization’ development 
paradigm, to increase economic prosperity and to ensure long-term 
stability of Australia’s neighbourhood. Australian private investment and 
exports from and imports to the Solomon Islands were low. During 
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the first decade after independence, British and Australian support was 
mainly in small loans to the government and as staffing assistance in 
government departments. The intention was to provide short-term expert 
assistance which bridged the period during which Solomon Islanders 
were trained to run their own bureaucracy.2 Often this failed when the 
foreign experts withdrew before locals were sufficiently trained to replace 
them. Australian aid to Solomon Islands during these years averaged 
A$7.5 million per annum, 1984-89. Australia and New Zealand provided 
secondary and tertiary education for a small but regular number of Solomon 
Islands students. Within the islands, Australia developed natural resources, 
principally in agriculture, forestry, fishing and cash crops suitable for 
small-holder farming, plus human resources, mainly in education and 
health, and provided infrastructure development including bridges, roads 
and schools. As always with aid donorship, much of the financial benefit 
went to Australian and New Zealand companies and personnel.3
Australia already had a substantial connection with the Solomon Islands. 
Between 1871 and 1904, 17,756 indenture contracts brought Solomon 
Islanders to work in maritime, pastoral and agricultural industries in colonial 
Queensland. Although large numbers were deported during the 1900s, a 
substantial Solomon Island community remains in coastal Queensland 
and northern New South Wales. While Australia was strengthening its 
diplomatic and aid-donor roles during the 1970s and 1980s, Australian 
Solomon Islanders have also remade strong links with their island of 
origin.4 As well, there was some Solomon Islands migration to Australia 
during the 1970s and 1980s, with 410 new arrivals in the 1980s. By 2001, 
Australia was home to 1,339 recent immigrant Solomon Islanders, some 
of whom were students and others permanent residents. They included two 
Members of the current Solomon Islands Parliament, Alfred Sasako and 
Simeon Bouru.5
Australian policy towards the Pacific began to change under Labor’s 
Gordon Bilney, Australia’s first ever Minister for Pacific Islands Affairs.6 
The South Pacific Forum meeting in Brisbane in 1994 was themed 
‘Managing our Resources’, and concentrated on human and natural 
resources. The next year, Australia reneged on part of the aid package to 
Solomon Islands when the Mamaloni government was harvesting timber 
at an unsustainable rate, against the advice of the Timber Control Unit of 
its own Ministry of Forestry. Australia suspended A$1.8 million of its total 
aid flow to Solomon Islands in 1995-96. The full program was reinstated 
a year later, with an Australian forester appointed as Commissioner for 
Forests and the enactment of the Timber Act 1996, designed to regulate 
the exploitation of forests.7
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Australian aid to Solomon Islands increased steadily in the late 1990s: 
A$11.02 million in 1997-98, A$13.33 million in 1998-99 and A$18.73 
million in 1999-2000, which was then around 20 percent of the total aid 
received.8 Two-way trade between Australia and Solomon Islands fell 
from $A96 million per annum in 1997 to $A64 in 2001.9 The Defence 
Cooperation Program was suspended after the coup in 2000. This program 
also helped train (obviously with little impact) the Royal Solomon Islands 
Police Force, provided many of the high-powered weapons that were 
stolen, and the patrol boat that straffed villages on Guadalcanal in the 
aftermath of the coup. Australia, with New Zealand, provided a series of 
warships to act as neutral venues for peace talks, as well as hosting the 
Townsville Peace Talks of October 2000. Australia, with New Zealand, 
Vanuatu and Fiji, also provided unarmed soldiers and police to be part 
of the International Peace Monitoring Team that oversaw the surrender 
of weapons. In the months before the June 2000 coup, Australia refused 
the entreaties of Prime Minister Ulafa’alu for direct military or police 
assistance, and when the crisis peaked with the coup that removed the 
government, Australia evacuated its citizens and other expatriates.
The nature of aid donors to the Solomon Islands changed after the coup. 
The social instability and poor record of economic and fiscal management 
led to a substantial reduction in international aid to Solomon Islands, 
from US$75 million in 1998 to US$28 million in 2001.10 Loans and aid 
packages from Taiwan and Australia became increasingly important. Over 
the years that followed the coup, the Australian government substantially 
increased aid to Solomon Islands in various forms: A$35.06 million in 
2000-01, A$40.57 million in 2001-02, A$36.2 million 2002-03, A$37.4 
million in 2003-04, and A$165.1 million for 2004-05.11 Australian NGOs 
(partly funded by the government) spent A$2.4 million in 2001 alone. 
Most of this aid (over 80 percent) was to strengthen social infrastructure, 
the police force and justice sectors, to help fund the national election and 
support the health sectors. As the central government crumbled, Australia 
began to experiment with more direct methods of funding, by-passing 
the government. This occurred through a health trust to maintain basic 
medical services, and a Community Peace and Restoration Fund that 
directly funded village-level health, education and water supply projects 
to disadvantaged communities.12
New Zealand’s approach to foreign policy was very different to that of 
Australia. An Australian diplomat and now Secretary of the South Pacific 
Forum, Greg Urwin wrote in late 2003:
New Zealand is, in a general and ultimately unquantifiable way, ‘closer’ to 
the South Pacific, and that closeness is increasing….there is an Australian 
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perception that New Zealand’s relations with at least parts of the region are 
evolving in ways that Australia’s are not.13
New Zealand has always had (proportionally to the total population) a 
more substantial indigenous population than Australia, and one closely 
connected by kinship with the Polynesian territories of the South Pacific. 
Long negotiations between Maori and Pakeha have proceeded differently 
from Australia’s less engaged negotiations with its indigenous community. 
There is also a growing Pacific Islander presence in New Zealand that is 
not matched in Australia,14 and New Zealand is certainly not in America’s 
shadow, in the same way Australia is. New Zealand also earned Melanesian 
credit when it ably played a constructive role in the reestablishment of 
peace in Bougainville; arguably more effective than Australia in this 
difficult situation. Although New Zealand has more limited donor funds 
available, its involvement with Pacific nations generally and with ‘trouble 
spots’ in particular has been commendable.15
New Zealand increased its aid commitments to Solomons Islands, from 
NZ$5.8 million in 1998-99 to a peak of NZ$9.2 million in 2000-01, 
then the amount declined to NZ$7.19 million in 2001-02 and NZ$4.8 
million in 2002-03, before increasing to NZ$14 million in 2003-04.16 
New Zealand aid primarily went to bolster good governance practices 
and education. Although they increased aid, Australia and New Zealand 
remained cautious of intervention. Throughout 1998-2003, the official 
Australian line was that the way forward lay in the hands of the Solomon 
Islands people and that solutions had to be developed within the country, 
not imposed from outside. Although willing to contribute substantial 
sums of aid and to encourage other donors not to desert Solomon Islands, 
Australia was shy of any direct intervention.
Australia spent more than A$30 million on the Solomon Islands post-
1999 peace negotiations, but two years on from the Townsville Peace 
Accord the process could hardly be claimed as a success. Australia and 
New Zealand continued to monitor the situation and in October 2002 sent a 
high level team to both Vanuatu and Solomon Islands.17 Alexander Downer 
and Phil Goff, Foreign Ministers for Australia and New Zealand, visited 
Honiara together early in January 2002, offering a cautious welcome to the 
new Kemakaza government. One product of this trip was the secondment 
of Perry Head, a senior Australian diplomat brought in from Vanuatu to 
assist the government with reconstruction. Alex Bartlett, the new Foreign 
Minister and former Malaita Eagles leader, showed no diplomatic skills 
when he presented his counterparts with carvings of eagles, the symbol 
of Malaita.18 At the time of the January 2002 visit, Solomon Islands 
requested S$115 million to run education, health and other basic services, 
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but Kemakeza was embarrassed when local radio announced another 
S$7.3 million of tax concessions just before the Foreign Ministers arrived, 
which brought the total of tax remissions over the last year to around 
S$100 million. Goff was blunt when he explained the circumstances under 
which his government would offer assistance: “New Zealand taxpayers’ 
money won’t be wasted by giving aid to Solomon Islands that will just 
be stolen.”19 Downer and Goff became regular visitors during 2002 and 
2003 as they battled to come to grips with what could be done to turn 
the Solomon Islands around. Downer was back again in December 2002, 
at a time when shots had been fired at the Prime Minister’s residence. 
Kemakeza was in fear for his life and being bullied by criminals who were 
Special Constables on the government payroll.20 Australian goodwill was 
obvious, but finding acceptable solutions was not easy.
Then in mid-2003 Australia and New Zealand made a major change 
in foreign policy direction. Particularly for Australia, it involved a new 
attitude towards Pacific Island nations by John Howard’s Liberal-National 
Party government. This change began with intervention in Solomon 
Islands, strengthened regional peace-keeping, took a more active role in 
the South Pacific Forum, and bolstered government practices in Papua New 
Guinea. RAMSI, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 
sent more than 2000 personnel into the Solomon Islands. The sudden 
turn around and dramatic change in policy from the Howard government, 
which had previously treated the Pacific Island nations indifferently, is 
perhaps the most complete about-face in Australian policy since the 180 
degree turn to support Indonesian acquisition of West New Guinea in 
1963, forty years ago. Previously, Prime Minister Howard showed little 
interests in the Pacific Islands and has failed to attend two recent South 
Pacific Forum meetings. Why the sudden change in attitude to the Pacific 
Islands nations, and why did the Australian government allow the situation 
in the Solomon Islands to go on for so many years before it intervened? 
Two Prime Ministers, Ulufa’alu in 1999-2000 and Sogavare in 2000-01 
had already pleaded with Australia to intervene, to no avail. Just before he 
was deposed by a coup in June 2000, Prime Minister Ulufa’alu said:
Why won’t you help us? It is not a question of Australia coming in and 
invading. It is a question of everybody in the country – the premiers, 
the church leaders, the trade unions, even the warring parties – all have 
concurred to a neutral body coming in.21
Rather than congratulating Australia on its 2003 intervention, a question 
needs to be asked: why not in 2000? What caused the dramatic change in 
policy in mid-2003 when Australia and other regional nations sent in 2,000 
troops, police and administrative helpers, and Australia committed itself to 
possibly A$2 billion in assistance over the next decade?
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A confluence of factors occurred. Certainly it was not just in answer 
to yet another request by the Solomon Islands government, when Prime 
Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza wrote to John Howard on 22 April 2003, 
asking for intervention, and was summoned to Canberra on an Australian 
Air Force jet on 5 June, to be told of Australia’s positive decision.22
New Zealand’s Foreign Minister seems to have come to the conclusion 
that intervention was necessary a few months before Australia did, but 
the key player was Australia, and as far as can be ascertained, Australian 
intervention was the initiative of Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, 
not that of his department officials or diplomatic staff, or John Howard. 
Australia’s Foreign Minister came late to his understanding of what was 
necessary. International circumstances had changed in the preceding year 
and all governments have had to rethink established global policies. After 
the New York terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 and the Bali bombing 
of 12 October 2002, Australia became more worried about its vulnerability. 
A study of the Bali incident by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(ASPI) drew the attention of the Australian government to the weakness 
of its Pacific neighbours:
Three of our closest neighbours—Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon 
Islands, and Vanuatu—are in different ways struggling to survive as 
functioning nations and societies. The Solomon Islands is the furthest down 
the road to state failure, but PNG and Vanuatu also face serious problems… 
. These countries are also potential havens for terrorist groups. They could 
serve as bases for groups planning attacks in Australia, and their weak 
security infrastructure means that such groups could not only slip in to 
these countries unnoticed, but could also use these states as points of entry 
to Australia.23
Over the years since 1998, when the IFM militia group drove 20,000 of 
their fellow citizens off Guadalcanal, Downer and his colleague Phil Goff 
from New Zealand had demonstrated their good will to Solomon Islands, 
but also quite clearly did not know how to proceed. The advice from their 
departments prior to 2003 was to avoid any allegations of neo-colonial 
behaviour and not to even hint at direct intervention. Yet in mid-2003 
they managed to convince their respective Prime Ministers and Cabinet 
colleagues to back them in a radical, expensive policy change.
It seems probable that a series of powerful arguments put forward by 
the Solomon Islands civil society networks and church leaders in the 
Solomons, Australia and New Zealand, by the media and by academics 
influenced government policy. In the Solomon Islands, the most influential 
views came from social commentator John Roughan. His critical writing on 
many aspects of Solomon Islands was widely syndicated. Honiara-based 
journalist, Mary-Louise O’Callaghan also had considerable influence 
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through her many articles in The Australian and her role as a contributor 
to the ASPI report Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of 
Solomon Islands. Another articulate analysis came from Terry Brown, 
the Church of Melanesia (Anglican) Bishop of Malaita. His excellent and 
widely-circulated “Ten Ways Australia and New Zealand can Help the 
Solomon Islands” was written in July 2003,24 but all during the 1998-2003 
years behind the scenes Bishop Brown (and presumably other leaders of 
the mainstream churches), were quietly influencing their Australian and 
New Zealand counterparts, who in turn lobbied politicians like Downer.25
Often quoted is ABC Radio Australia journalist Graeme Dobell’s 
“Policy Taboos, Popular Amnesia” essay written in February 2003 for 
the Menzies Research Centre Lecture Series on Australian Security in the 
twenty-first century.26 Dobell called on the government to “embrace our 
responsibility”, and that Australians could have no exit strategy from the 
South Pacific, because they lived there as well. Engagement, said Dobell, 
was the only real possibility.
Academic Mark Otter of Queensland University, facilitator of the 
Solomon Islands Human Development Report 2002 also called for 
Australian military intervention in several papers written during 2002-03. 
He told the Senate Inquiry that:
Solomon Islands is in very real danger of collapsing as a state and becoming 
just one more basket case. Australia alone, or in association with New 
Zealand and other Pacific states, has the capability to restore order to the 
Solomons.27
Speaking at a July 2002 Pacific Update conference in Canberra and on 
ABC radio, Otter raised questions about the basic similarities between 
the situation in East Timor and Solomon Islands. Otter reminded listeners 
that both countries were Australia’s neighbours, small, underdeveloped, 
racked by violence, and both had long historical ties with Australia.28 
Helen Hughes, a Senior Fellow of the Centre for Independent Studies 
at Australian National University with expertise on Pacific economic 
development, was another influential voice. Hughes’ important paper “Aid 
Has Failed the Pacific” was published in Issues Analysis in May 2003 and 
presented to the Senate inquiry, while her “Helping the Islands to Help 
Themselves” was published in the July-August edition of Quadrant.29
The ASPI’s Our Failing Neighbour was launched by Foreign Minister 
Downer in June 2003. The main author, Elsina Wainwright, collated a 
range of opinions and argued persuasively that only direct intervention 
could protect the Solomons from complete anarchy.30 Her report urged 
the establishment of a multinational agency to take control of Solomon 
Islands, by deploying an international police force, with the support of the 
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Solomon Islands government.31 Our Failing Neighbour estimated that this 
phase would take about one year, and would be followed by about 10 years 
of international support to rebuild Solomon Islands’ capacity for effective 
government. The cost of the operation was estimated at approximately 
$A850, with Australia footing about half of the bill. This forecast a 
significant increase in Australian aid to the Pacific.
The then ASPI Director Hugh White, former foreign policy advisor to 
Prime Minister Bob Hawke and ex-Deputy Secretary of the Department 
of Defence, is an influential figure in Canberra. Drafts of the ASPI report 
were distributed around Canberra late in 2002. One copy went to Milner 
Tozaka, Solomon Islands High Commissioner to Australia, who provided 
copies to his Prime Minister, Governor-General Sir John Ini Lapli and 
Speaker of Parliament Sir Peter Kenilorea. Thus, although not an official 
Australian government statement, the ASPI report was extremely influential 
in alerting both the Australian and Solomon Islands governments to the 
possibility of some form of intervention. ASPT provided the Australian 
government with the draft of what became their intervention policy.32
The report stressed a security theme, and exaggerated the terrorist and 
security dangers of the failing Solomon state, but these themes became the 
official justification for Australia’s increased aid and direct intervention in 
Solomon Islands. When Kemakeza requested assistance from Australia 
in his letter of 22 April, Howard was just back from Washington, where 
Australia was declared America’s ‘deputy sheriff’ in the Pacific region. The 
Australian rhetoric sounded logical—a smooth follow-on from Australian 
military commitments in Afghanistan, Bougainville, Bali and Iraq. The 
ASPI report argues that a ‘failed state’ in Solomon Islands would allow 
terrorist, gunrunners, drug-lords and refugees easy access to Australia 
from across the Coral Sea. ASPI provided the government with a ready-
made rationale and justification:
Without an effective government upholding the rule of law and controlling 
its borders, Solomon Islands risks becoming—and has to some extent already 
become—a petri dish in which transnational and non-state security threats 
can develop and breed. Despite its poverty, there is wealth in Solomon 
Islands for those with the will to extract it: gold, timber and fish. If the state 
cannot provide security and a legal framework in which such extraction can 
occur, others will. And their methods will be far from attractive.33
Wainwright’s analysis, informed by her work on conflict in the Balkans, 
was innovative in suggesting that police rather than armed forces personnel 
should be used to restore law and order.34 However, she ignored the fact 
that anarchy in Solomon Islands was largely confined to Honiara with a 
spill-over to Auki in Malaita, which had little relevance to the 84 percent 
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of the population who live in rural areas. Her stress on preventing the 
Solomons becoming a base for criminals, who could then affect Australia, 
was an exaggeration. All newcomers are rather obvious in the Solomons 
and easily observed. Yet there was an element of truth in the ASPI and 
Australian government reasoning. The arrival of several men in Honiara 
during early 2003, thought to be from Pakistan, motivated locals to 
think about terrorist infiltration, and efforts to introduce Islam into the 
Solomon Islands have met with opposition.35 There was also the problem 
of pyramid money-making schemes and shonky get-rich plans, grasped 
at by the government and people alike as a possible answer to their 
problems. A failing state on Australia’s doorstep, with a corrupt ineffective 
government, was not the sort of neighbour Australia wanted. But the 
Australian government chose to pin its public statements on the security 
explanation, which touched the correct note with the Australian public, 
even though privately the government had much more complex reasons 
for intervention.
The international context was muddled by the involvement of France, 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. France (through New Caledonia) 
offered to contribute immediately to any intervention, a reasonable offer 
from a neighbouring country, but one the Howard government outright 
refused.36 Australia’s decision was also influenced by events in Papua New 
Guinea. Alarmed by the deterioration in conditions in its neighbour, Papua 
New Guinea had been considering taking action of its own since early 
April 2003 when officials were sent to Honiara to talk to the government. 
Papua New Guinea had offered to send in a crack unit from its Defence 
Force to capture Guadalcanal renegade leader Harold Keke. After Papua 
New Guinea’s Prime Minister Somare met with John Howard while both 
were in Japan in June 2003, the PNGDF was instructed to prepare for a 
trip to Guadalcanal. Australia would have looked very weak if Papua New 
Guinea had been the first neighbouring nation to go to the aid of Solomon 
Islands.37
What part did a request by the desperate Kemakeza government for 
Indonesian assistance play in Australia’s decision? At the April 2003 
summit of Asia-Pacific Foreign Ministers in Bali after the terrorist outrage, 
Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Laurie Chan passed a letter to the 
Indonesian government, requesting assistance. Alfred Sasako, now the 
Solomon Islands Minister for Agriculture, believes that the Australian 
government obtained a copy of this letter, and reacted to it.38 The Solomon 
Islands High Commissioner in Australia confirmed the letter’s existence 
when he was interviewed on Australia’s SBS television service, and stated 
that “Indonesia was considering sending its troops to address the problem”. 
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Tozaka also said that Australia was aware of the Bali discussions.39
Kemakeza wrote to Indonesia and Australia at almost the same time. 
Just two weeks before Kemakeza was called to Canberra to discuss 
matters with John Howard, Indonesia’s Ambassador to Solomon Islands 
(based in Port Moresby) visited Honiara from 20 to 25 May to present his 
credentials.40 While experts on Indonesian doubt that its military forces 
have the capacity to intervene in the Solomon Islands, there is no doubt 
that an approach was made by the Solomons. The only official outcome 
was the Ambassador’s visit and an agreement for technical cooperation.41 
After the Indonesian army’s campaign of violence in the run-up to 
independence in East Timor and continuing military atrocities in its Papua 
Provinces (the new name of Irian Jaya Province), an Indonesian presence 
would not have been welcomed in the Pacific by Australia or Papua New 
Guinea. The request for Indonesian intervention played some part in 
Australia’s timing.
In a sense, the Australian government gave in to the inevitable. If the 
situation in the Solomon Islands deteriorated further, the world’s leaders 
would expect Australia—America’s ‘deputy sheriff’ in the Pacific—to 
deal with the matter. After all, the islands are on Australia’s doorstep. The 
Melanesian nations across the Coral Sea from Australia have a population 
of close to seven million. The potential collapse of a nation, after coups in 
Solomon Islands and Fiji, instability in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, 
economic collapse in Nauru, and economic mismanagement and poor 
governance throughout, would become Australia’s problem.
There was a strong argument that it was better to try to try to fix the 
problems before they became worse. Intervention also sent a message to 
other Pacific nations that Australia (and New Zealand) were now willing 
to deal directly with problems in the neighbourhood. The United Nations 
was fairly ineffectual, although the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
supported the intervention. But there was no purpose to try to get the 
support of the Security Council. Mainland China would veto the move 
because Solomon Islands is one of the few nations which gives diplomatic 
recognition to Taiwan.42
A nation with a government too frightened, incompetent and corrupt 
to govern was a worst-case scenario, but imminent. Downer and Goff 
had nightmares of finding a Pacific version of Rwanda on their doorstep. 
The Solomon Islands’ provinces were maneuvering towards increased 
autonomy, but the disintegration of the Solomon Islands into several 
separate island states was against all post-war decolonization principles of 
forming new nations, even when divided by ethnic and cultural differences. 
The possible future fragmentation of Indonesia or Papua New Guinea is 
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a long-standing fear of Australian foreign policy planners. Fragmentation 
of the Solomons into smaller nations was against all post-war attempts to 
create unity in newly independent states.
However, John Howard’s rationale was more pragmatic and appealed to 
his chosen electoral platforms as a strong-man leader. As Howard said in 
August 2003:
The international community looks to Australia to play a leading role in 
the South Pacific. Our leadership of the regional assistance mission to 
the Solomon Islands reflects both a national interest and an international 
expectation. A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the peoples 
of the Solomon Islands but could also pose a significant risk for the whole 
region. Failed states can all too easily become safe-havens for transnational 
criminals and even terrorists. Poor governance and endemic corruption 
provide the conditions that support criminal activities.43
When the Solomon Islands fell apart in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
Australia was involved in Timor, Bougainville, Afghanistan and Iraq, 
which absorbed a huge amount of government funds. Although Australia 
is a large nation compared with its Pacific neighbours, overseas defense 
involvements and the extraordinary policy of relocating refugees in nearby 
island states such as Nauru and Papua New Guinea, had been costly. 
Australian electors see the South Pacific as a holiday destination, not a 
potential threat, and do not understand governance and mismanagement 
issues in nations such as Solomon Islands. Howard was a slow learner as 
a Pacific statesman, but he is ruthless in his exploitation of political issues. 
The Tampa illegal refugees incident and the ‘children overboard’ scandal, 
when refugees were falsely accused of throwing their children into the 
ocean, was exploited shamelessly by Howard to win the 2001 national 
election. Solomon Islands intervention and the ‘Pacific solution’ must also 
be seen in the context of Howard’s domestic election campaign for 2004. 
America demanded that Australia police the South Pacific region. The 
Solomons crisis gave the Howard government the chance to act decisively 
in the region and provided a good reason to not commit any more troops 
to Iraq, given the extensive local commitment.
Why did Australia decide to act in May 2003, when it should and 
could have done so any time over the previous three years? Australia’s 
international and domestic circumstances of 1998 to early 2003 were 
altogether different from those of mid-2003. Also, by 2003, after several 
years of monitoring the decline in the Solomon Islands, the Australian 
government knew that if they did not take direct action the situation 
could deteriorate into unthinkable chaos. Exactly how Downer convinced 
Howard we will probably never know. In June 2000, Downer had told 
the Australian Parliament that “ethnic conflict” was the root cause of 
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the conflict.44 Six months later, when the Solomon Islands Opposition 
moved a vote of no-confidence in the government, Australian diplomats in 
Honiara were not in favour of a change of government, and still advised 
against any Australian action. Up until May 2003, Australia made quite 
clear it was opposed to any outside intervention and preferred the stability 
of Kemakeza and his tainted Cabinet to an unknown new power group.
The Australian government made a decision to support Kemakeza’s 
government, not to remove it, despite its shortcomings. As Downer told a 
reporter that at the time of Kemakeza’s letter to Howard in April 2003:
The bottom line is that we just couldn’t leave Solomons to wither on the 
vine and become a failed state. We did a great job in East Timor, we did a 
great job in Afghanistan and in Iraq; we couldn’t have people saying: How 
come you did absolutely nothing in Solomons? So when the Prime Minister 
asked me about Kemakeza’s letter, I told him: ‘Look, the situation is just 
dire, I think we should take this very seriously and have a look at what we 
can do.45
Downer had certainly become more knowledgeable about Solomon 
Islands between 1998 and 2003, and stronger in his resolve to recommend 
intervention, but in the end it was up to Prime Minister Howard.
Howard’s decision to intervene with military force in 2003 was not 
because of any sincere change of attitude towards Australia’s Pacific 
neighbours. When he began as Prime Minister, Howard was not confident 
in foreign policy, but he has done remarkably well in his overseas ventures, 
and in 2003 he wanted to ‘cut a dash’ in the Pacific that would leave him 
remembered for more than the introduction of the Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) and persecuting refugees. The time was right internationally 
and domestically, and it suited the statesman role he wanted to play in his 
later years as Prime Minister. Intervention in the Solomons Islands in mid-
2003 also helped divert attention away from the embarrassing lies told by 
Howard’s government about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Bush 
and Blair were in serious political trouble because of their exaggerations, 
and Howard was allied to them. Howard is a manipulative and successful 
politician, and central to the decision to intervene was his ability to judge 
the electorate. The intervention proved popular with Australian voters, 
with opinion pools indicating 75 percent support for Howard’s decision to 
send troops to Honiara.46
Intervention in failed states—since similar operations in the Balkans, 
Afghanistan, East Timor, some African nations and Solomon Islands—and 
a planned bureaucratic intervention in Papua New Guinea, while not 
without risk, had worked and was seen internationally as a practical not 
neo-colonial or unwelcome invasion of national sovereignty. In the six 
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months after intervention in Solomon Islands, the Australian government 
took on a more active role in the South Pacific, a new phase after almost 30 
years of a hand-off approach to uneven, periodic unrest in the islands. Calls 
for pooled regional governance in the Pacific were followed by a package 
of reforms. After the Solomon Islands intervention, Australia secured 
its nominee, diplomat Greg Urwin, as the next Secretary-General of the 
South Pacific Forum, suggested the adoption of a common currency by 
Pacific Islands nations and a free trade block, and announced finance for a 
Regional Police Training College in Fiji. Australia then offered 300 police 
and 200 public servants to bolster good governance and administration 
of the Papua New Guinea. The Solomon Islands intervention was far 
too late, and probably over-extended Australia’s global peace-keeping 
and interventionist commitments, but when 2,200 soldiers and police, 
accompanied by experts to in governance procedures landed at Honiara in 
July 2003, Solomon Islanders collectively breathed a sigh of relief.47
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